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Shareholders’ Agreements 
 
 
Abstract. The essay deals with the syndicate contract functioning as a preparation to 
partnership contract or a skeleton agreement. The syndicate contract, as an atypical-
innominate contract, also evolved in the Hungarian legal practice concerning major 
companies. The essay distinguishes the syndicate contract from agreement in principle (in 
the Hungarian Civil Code). It discusses in details the problems of joining the syndicate 
contract at a later stage, the collisions of syndicate and partnership contracts and their 
consequences. In analyses the consequences of the breach of syndicate contract 
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1. Competition Law and Company Law Approach 
 
In commercial law, shareholders’ agreements are discussed from two 
different points of view: in a sense of competition law and in a sense of 
company law. 
 In a sense of competition law, the shareholders’ agreement (syndicate 
agreement) is a qualified cartel contract. The essence of the cartel is that 
it is an agreement limiting (precluding) competition—with regard to prices, 
quantity of production, conditions of business deals, geographic area or other 
aspects. In a more narrow sense, the cartel is directed at influencing market 
behaviour, at the market itself. The shareholders’ agreement is stronger 
than the market cartel: it is broadened to include matters of production 
and product development, e.g. specialisation, cooperation of production, 
cooperation of research and development etc. 
 In Hungarian competition law, the narrowly understood (market) cartel 
and the production-development or syndicate cartel are not separately 
treated. Arts. 11–20 of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market 
Conduct and Limiting Competition preclude as a general rule cartels in 
both the more narrow and the broader (syndicate) sense—proclaiming as 
generally illegal (with exceptions and the possibility of providing 
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exemptions—relative prohibition of cartels) all such agreements concluded in 
a written form, orally, or by actual conduct. Consequently in Hungarian 
literature the competition law meaning of shareholders’ agreements has 
faded, we only talk of cartel agreements.1 
 The company law interpretation of shareholders’ agreements remains 
all the stronger. Precisely the multiparty and multisided, but at the same 
time—towards the outside world—cooperative-organisatory nature of the 
companies (organisational obligation as opposed to barter-based contracts: 
Steinbach), their characteristic as being based upon a long-term and generally 
significant joint ownership and a dominance of the community of interests 
of the parties and the companies’ relative separation from their members 
is the reason behind the fact that the members in the case of a number of 
companies 
 — formed in perpetuity (or for a longer definite period of 10–15 years) 
 — with large funds 
 — and with legal personality 
 — conclude a shareholders’ agreement alongside the company agreement. 
 The subject matter of the shareholders’ agreement is thus the formation 
and the operation of the company. 
 The shareholders’ agreement, as its name in common law areas implies, 
evolved in relation to stock corporations with large funds. Later, however, 
in German and French law it appeared also in relation to larger limited 
liability companies and is even exceptionally to be found among firms 
created in the form of partnership or limited partnership. 
 The shareholders’ agreement thus became a general institution of the 
law of commercial companies. It must, however, be stressed that—in the lack 
of a statutory definition—the parties may conclude shareholders’ agreements 
outside the realm of company law, e.g. it is not unknown for partners to 
complex investments to call their cooperation framework agreement a 
shareholders’ agreement. But shareholders’ agreements are found also in 
the law of non-profit organisations, e.g. among non-profit limited liability 
companies or associations. At the same time, in case of the formation of stock 
corporations by public share offering, the conclusion of a shareholders’ 
agreement before the founders’ meeting is not usual, only maybe later, 
and even then not among all shareholders but only major shareholders. For 
similar reasons, the shareholders’ agreement—as concluded on a founders’ 
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meeting, alongside the articles of association—is also rare among co-
operatives. 
 Following the general reform of Company Law new-regulation at the 
end of the 1980’s, the instrument of the shareholders’ agreement has also 
been reborn in Hungarian practice at the beginning of the 1990’s. The 
spreading practice had been supported by scholarly literature.2 At the 
same time a lot of interesting and open legal issues arise in the topic of 
the shareholders’ agreement. 
 
 
2. The Independence of the Shareholders’ Agreement 
 
The shareholders’ agreement is directed towards the operation of the 
company and regulates the cooperation of the parties to the agreement with 
regard to the operation of the company. At the same time the shareholders’ 
agreement and the company agreement are two independent contracts, 
usually not even concluded at the same time. The shareholders’ agreement 
is generally already concluded before the company agreement, there is, how-
ever, nothing to prevent the shareholders’ agreement from being concluded 
after the company agreement. (A special form of the shareholders’ agree-
ment, agreements as to the order of voting in the company’s main organs 
are often concluded later.) 
 The parties to the shareholders’ agreement and the company agreement 
are generally the same, but 
 — a person who is not a member of the company may be a party to the 
shareholders’ agreement, either originally, even before the formation of 
the company, or he may “join” the shareholders’ agreement through its 
modification later. The company may have members who were not originally 
parties to the shareholders’ agreement. Anybody may cancel the share-
holders’ agreement while keeping his share in the company (he may leave 
the syndicate) or new members who do not join the shareholders’ 
agreement may join the company. 
 — the shareholders’ agreement may be in force only between a part of 
the company’s shareholders. 
 
 — generally by selling stocks or shares and thus becoming a member 
of the company one does not automatically become a party to the share-

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holders’ agreement. The succession as to membership does not mean a 
change of parties
 or succession regarding the shareholders’ agreement; 
the party has to join that separately. 
 — in some instances (although rarely) it happens that the company as a 
legal person itself joins the shareholders’ agreement (necessarily only after its 
conclusion, if the shareholders’ agreement is concluded before the company 
agreement, but if it is concluded only afterwards, it may even be an 
original party.) 
 The subject matter of the shareholders’ agreement and the company 
agreement also necessarily differ, it may be mutually broader or narrower. 
The company agreement regulates the cooperation of the members, but 
 — certain questions of cooperation are regulated only in the shareholders’ 
agreement; 
 — issues regulated in the company agreement or by Company Law do 
not fall under the scope of the shareholders’ agreement, although may be 
mentioned in both the company agreement and the shareholders’ agree-
ment; 
 — there is nothing to prevent the parties from regulating in the share-
holders’ agreement issues not touched upon in the company agreement or 
not falling under the scope of company law, e.g. issues of limitation of 
competition or matters of intellectual property law, the use of trademarks 
etc. 
   
 
3. The Shareholders’ Agreement as a special atypical Contract 
 
The Hungarian civil law—as modern civil law systems generally—does 
not impose a limitation as to possible types of contract. The Part of the 
Civil Code on Specific Obligations lists the most common types of 
contract, but 
 — separate pieces of legislation may regulate other types of contract 
(this is how the concession contract, the funds management contract, the 
sponsorship contract etc. have been created), 
 — representatives of industry groups may create new types of contract 
through trade usages, standard form contracts (basically this is what 
happened in the case of the leasing or franchise contract, but 
 — anybody at any time may also individually create new contracts not 
fitting into a statutorily defined type of contract. The shareholders’ 
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agreement is in this latest group, it is so specific that general terms as to it 
may hardly be created.3  
 Qualification as an atypical contract only means that the given contract 
does not belong to a type of contract regulated in the Civil Code (and 
consequently recognised by statute). However, an overwhelming majority 
of atypical contracts are at the same time mixed contracts, i.e. they are not 
typical contracts also because they had been created using the charac-
teristics of several types of contract. Generally, also the Hungarian court 
practice developed in the direction to apply the rules of the type of 
contract that stands closest to the given atypical-mixed contract in cases 
when the contract fails to regulate a certain issue. This application, however, 
happens “adequately”, often with the use of extensive interpretation, even 
analogy. 
 The shareholders’ agreement is a cooperative contract; it is therefore a 
point of interest that the shareholders’ agreement belongs to a “type” that 
is itself not named within the law and exists only in legal theory. The lower 
level of cooperative contracts are merely of a moral nature, qualified as 
gentlemen’s agreements. The shareholders’ agreement is, however, a business 
contract and may not be qualified simply as an expression of best intentions, 
the breach of which in Hungarian law may only result in a possibility of a 
tort claim of damages for expenses incurred in reliance if intentional 
misleading conduct is shown. The shareholders’ agreement is a contract 
falling under the Civil Code; a conduct in opposition to its terms is a breach 
of contract. 
 The shareholders’ agreement has certain aspects—especially if the 
shareholders’ agreement is concluded before the conclusion of the company 
agreement and the shareholders’ agreement is terminated with the formation 
of the company—which may qualify as a “consortium”, as a partnership 
agreement and consequently may fall directly or by way of analogy under 
Arts. 568-578 of the Civil Code. The shareholders’ agreement in other 
cases also stands close to the civil partnership as it is a contract with no 
requirement of form, although generally put down in writing, it may be 
concluded orally. As opposed to that, commercial companies (including 
partnerships) all over Europe share a mandatory requirement of written 

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 Company or commercial laws of West-European countries do not regulate the 
Shareholders’ Agreement and it naturally does not appear in the current Hungarian 
Civil Code either. Of the ccmpany laws created in East-European countries in the 
1990’, one is known to include rules—of course, hardly more than a definition—of 
shareholders’ agreements, that one being Albanian law. 
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form, stock corporations and limited liability companies even a qualified 
written form (e.g. a notarial document), moreover the law defines the 
mandatory substantive elements of the company agreement (articles of 
association).4 Exceptionally in civil partnerships a mandatory requirement 
of written form may also be found, e.g. as to building communities; Art. 
578/B (2) of the Civil Code. 
 A phenomenon similar to the more organised forms of the civil partner-
ship is that the shareholders’ agreement creates an organisation independent 
of the organisation of the company whose operation is the subject matter 
of the contract. Such is for example the syndicate meeting that is usually 
held immediately prior to the general meeting of the company, although 
generally may be called together at any time upon the request of any 
member. On syndicate meetings the members of the company often bring 
more important decisions as to the operation of the company than on 
general meetings, or the syndicate decisions may determine the decisions 
of the general meeting. 
 It may happen that the shareholders’ agreement meets all the requirements 
of an agreement to agree or that the shareholders’ agreement contains an 
agreement to conclude a company agreement as well. (The eventuality of a 
shareholders’ agreement being solely an agreement to conclude a company 
agreement is rare in practice). According to Art. 208 of the Civil Code the 
shareholders’ agreement qualifies as an agreement to form a company 
agreement if the parties to the shareholders’ agreement oblige themselves 
to conclude a company agreement (form a given type of commercial 
company) in accordance with the terms of the shareholders’ agreement at 
a determined, later date. The agreement to agree usually runs out with the 
conclusion of the final contract, whereas the shareholders’ agreement 
generally remains in force. 
 The basic problem with the possible qualification of the shareholders’ 
agreement as an agreement to agree in Hungary is that according to Art. 
208 (1) of the Civil Code the agreement to agree must be concluded following 
the formal requirements established for the final contract which, on the other 
hand, according to Art. 10 of the Act on Business Associations (hereinafter 
referred to as Companies Act) would entail drawing up a notarial document 
or the signature of a lawyer. The parties to the shareholders’ agreement 
tend, however, not to follow the qualified written form. In case of company 

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 About this issue, see Fischer, F.: Die Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts. Hamburg, 
1977. 271–280. and Ulmer, P.: Die Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts. München, 
1980. 5–8. 
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agreements the application of Art. 208 pars. (3)–(4) of the Civil Code is also 
hard to imagine. According to these rules, in case of a failure to conclude 
the final contract the court may create the contract—and establish its 
terms—at the request of any of the parties, moreover the court may 
exceptionally modify the terms agreed upon by the parties in the agreement 
to agree. Such an intervention by the court would, in case of multiparty 
contracts of a long duration, be in discrepancy with the principle of 
private autonomy. The rules of the company agreement would anyway be 
almost impossible to apply to an agreement to conclude a company 
agreement [Art. 208 (6) of the Civil Code]. Therefore I believe that the 
rules pertaining to agreements to agree in the Civil Code, modelled on 
barter-based contracts, are not applicable to the shareholders’ agreement—
even though its core subject matter is an agreement to conclude a later 
company agreement. Namely, as a result of its multiparty and multisided 
nature, the conclusion of the company agreement may not be regarded as a 
series of separate offers and their acceptance, the future partners must 
accept a unified draft contract and no mutual performances between the 
parties exist in the way as it does in contracts for the exchange of goods.5 
 The shareholders’ agreement is definitely not to be confused with the 
instrument of pre-incorporation company existing from the signing of the 
company agreement to the judicial registration of the company (Arts. 14–
15 of the Companies Act), although there is naturally nothing to prevent the 
parties from concluding a shareholders’ agreement solely for this period. 
But even in this case the shareholders’ agreement and the pre-incorporation 
company are different. 
 The basic difference is that the commercial company is a company 
registered by the state. In the majority of European laws the company gains a 
commercial name and legal existence, or, in the case of stock corporations 
and limited liability companies, legal personality constituted by inclusion 
in the register (either ex tunc, i.e. retrospectively to the conclusion of the 
company agreement as in the 1988 Hungarian Companies Act, or ex nunc, 
i.e. for the future, as it is laid down in our current 1997 Companies Act). 
Therefore the process of the formation of the company—as modelled 
especially by Fritz Rittner, Professor at Freiburg University—may be 
broken down into two phases.6 
 The first phase is the internal bargaining process of the future company 
members
 which may, in the given case, be regulated by the shareholders’ 

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 See Müller, R.: Gesellschaftsvertrag und Synnallegma. Zürich, 1971. 16–21. 
 
6
 See Rittner, F.: Die werdende juristische Person. Tübingen, 1972. 52–72. 
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agreement. The second phase, in which the future members play a mostly 
passive role, although it is initiated by them, is obtaining State recognition. 
Registration primarily means the state approval of the formation and operation 
of the commercial company which in the so-called system of normative 
requirements (in its historic origins crated to replace the general concession 
system) entails a control of legality and at the same time results in the 
inclusion of the company in the official register, providing publicity and 
thus the possibility of the control of publicity over the company to begin.7 
 The juridical registration procedure is a process, situations arising 
under which—e.g. whether the company may or may not operate and if it 
may, under what conditions—must be regulated by law. If state registration 
comes to pass, the law must regulate the transition from the temporary 
State to the final state, in a way which in the case of an already operating 
company expresses the continuity of the company’s operations, but also 
the qualitative leap which obtaining legal personality, the official recognition 
of the company entails.8 If, on the other hand, registration is denied with 
no further possibility of appeal, the preliminary formation operating in the 
hope of recognition must immediately be dissolved, but in a way so as to 
settle the internal (those between the members of the company) and 
external (e.g. contracts with third parties or employees) legal relationships 
arising between the conclusion of the company agreement and the refusal 
of registration. 
 The phase between the conclusion of the company agreement and the 
state judicial decision on recognition may theoretically be regulated by 
law according to two models. 
 a) The identity of the preliminary society and the final society may be 
denied and the “founding society”, the “association of founders” may 
be regulated in both the internal and external legal relationships 
independently, following the analogous application of the loosest 
organisatory obligation, the civil partnership.9 The internal and external 
relations of the unregistered company, the different questions of 
liability may adequately be dealt with on the basis of the rules of the 
Civil Code. This solution is especially advantageous in the case of an ex 
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 See Mummenhoff, W.: Gründungsysteme und Rechtsfähigkeit. Berlin, 1979. 7–
13. 
 
8
 See Büttner, P.: Identität und Kontinuität bei der Gründung der juristischen 
Person. Bielefeld, 1967. 111–128. 
 
9
 See Fabricius, F.: Vorgesellschaften bei den A.G. und GmbH, ein Irrweg? In: 
W. Kastner Festschrift. Wien, 1972. 212–213. 
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tunc constitutive registration system, as in this case the registration 
process takes a longer time and therefore it is more correct if the 
decisions of the “preliminary” become the decisions of the company 
with the express decision of the highest organ of the registered company 
(this is why this solution was applied by the Companies Act of 1988). 
 b) If, however, the preliminary operates until registration according to 
the rules pertaining to the final company, a pre-incorporation company 
is created which, contrary to the civil partnership, is some kind of a 
legal subject.10 The Vorgesellschaft had been created in relation to the 
limited liability company and the private stock corporation—these 
rules are harder to apply to the foundation of corporations by IPO, 
because of, if nothing else, the stricter imperative public law rules 
of the securities supervisory authority. In this case “continuity” 
dominates in the relationship between the “future” limited liability 
company or the future stock corporation and the final company; if the 
company is registered, the legal transactions of the pre-incorporation 
company automatically become—as succession is theoretically ruled 
out—the legal transactions of the final company (the limited legal 
existence melts into the full legal personality of the company).11 If, 
on the other hand, the company is a “defective”, “illegal” company and 
the court refuses registration after the exhaustion of possibilities of 
appeal, then the preliminary must be terminated basically according to 
the rules pertaining to the planned commercial company (although e.g. 
in Hungarian law, no formal termination takes place and the company is 
not dissolved either). Basically this German model had been transposed 
by the 1997 Companies Act, connecting this naturally with a maximum 
time limit of the registration process in the Law on the Process of 
Company Registration (Art. 44 of Act CXLV of 1997) and an ex 
nunc system of registration (Art. 16 of the Companies Act). The pre-
incorporation company of a Hungarian limited liability company 
(LLC) or stock corporation (SC) is already an LLC p.r. or an SC 
p.r., i.e. a company pending registration. (Interestingly enough the 
new Hungarian Law on Cooperatives, Act CXLI of 2000 dropped, 
with regard to cooperatives, the institution of “pre-incorporation 
cooperative”, introduced following the 1997 Companies Act, and 
returned to the civil partnership solution.) 
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 See Kiesslig, E.: Vorgründung und Vorgesellschaften. Berlin, 1999. 31–39. 
 
11
 See John, U.: Die organisierte Rechtsperson. Köln, 1976. 307–311. 
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It must, however, be stressed that no matter whether the legal order accepts 
the first or the second solution as to the formation of the commercial 
company, the shareholders’ agreement may never—not even with the civil 
partnership solution—be equated with the pre-incorporation company. 
 
 
4. The Reasons Behind the Conclusion of a  
 Shareholders’ Agreement 
 
Concluding a shareholders’ agreement “before” or “alongside” a company 
agreement may be due to several reasons. The most typical are the following: 
 a) A typical purpose is to organise the cooperation of the future 
members in the possibly rather long period before the conclusion of 
the company agreement (or later, as the case may be, should e.g. a 
new member join) in order to enable a least problematic foundation 
of the company. In this case the shareholders’ agreement, even if it is not 
an agreement to agree, is a “preparatory” contract. A typical element 
of this preparation is related to setting up the company’s funds by the 
members with non-monetary contributions. The previous evaluation of 
contributions in kind—especially in the case of intellectual property—
is a rather complicated question and may have consequences as to the 
future balance of power within the company, the involvement of an 
accountant or accountants is mandatory. (The parties should also 
regulate e.g. the procedure to be followed in case the court refuses to 
accept certain parts of the contributions in kind etc.) 
 b) In the majority of cases the shareholders’ agreement is not terminated 
with the formation of the company but remains parallel in force 
during the period of the operation of the company. In this case the 
shareholders’ agreement shows the characteristics of a framework 
agreement, including terms pertaining to the conduct of the members 
in relation to the organisation and the operation of the company during 
the whole period of the existence of the company—thus whether e.g. 
on the general shareholders’ meeting votes are to be cast so as to 
appoint to the board of directors the candidate of each of the members, 
or so that the supervisory board should elect the candidate of the 
minority member as the chairman of the supervisory board etc. We 
remark that in several cases the shareholders’ agreement remains in 
force for a shorter period after the termination of the company—e.g. 
members may oblige themselves to abide by the so called non-
compete clauses, not to form companies with a similar sphere of 
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activity for a certain period of time with other partners after the 
termination of the company etc. 
 
 
5. Collisions between the Company Agreement 
 and the Shareholders’ Agreement 
 
If the shareholders’ agreement and the company agreement are parallel in 
force, several interesting problems arise out of the independence of the 
two contracts. 
 
a) The publicity of the content of the company agreement, the secrecy  
 of the content of the shareholders’ agreement 
 It is characteristic of the law of commercial companies that it places 
the interests of business secrecy important in the economic life to the 
background in preference for the public interest of the publicity of the 
operation of the commercial companies (Publizitätskontroll). The Law 
on the Procedure of Registration of Companies defines the sphere of 
data to be included in the register, documents to be submitted to the 
court, rules that companies’ accounts should be made public etc. 
Moreover, anybody may at any time—without even rendering probable 
an interest recognised by law as to this—inspect the register free of 
charge. (See the 1st EU Company Law Directive on Publicity.) 
  An important purpose of the shareholders’ agreement is to regulate 
those details of the cooperation between the members which the parties 
do not intend to make public and the publicity of which is not prescribed 
in a mandatory manner by the company law or the registration law. 
From these details the competitors may namely draw inferences, which 
would disadvantage the position of the company or its members in the 
market competition. 
  
 b) Choice of law
  
 A large proportion of the members of companies in Hungary are foreigners. 
A significant number of Central-Eastern European countries suffer 
from a lack of capital and thus encourages foreign investment. These 
investments are mainly realised in the form of companies, even if the 
law of the State receiving investment provides the possibility of opening a 
direct appearance by the foreign company e.g. in the form of opening a 
branch subsidiary. Especially in the case of a foreign majority or owner-
ship by a single foreigner the foreigner wishes to transplant as much of 
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his law as possible, conclude contracts in his own language, have dispute 
relating to the foundation and operation of the company settled in 
court procedures he is familiar with. 
  The company, however, has legal existence, the stock corporation and 
the limited liability company are legal persons, the stock corporation 
and the limited liability company are important actors in the economic 
life, therefore all countries insist on applying their own company law 
to companies which have their seat on national territory, to have the 
official version of the company agreement drawn up in the official 
language, as the registration process and the register itself are necessarily 
in that language. In company law therefore there is no general freedom 
of choice of law otherwise recognised among the principles of private 
international law—thus also the Hungarian Act on Private International 
Law (Art. 24 of Law-decree No.13 of 1978). 
  The shareholders’ agreement, however, falls under the general rules 
of collisions
 on applicable law, therefore the foreigner may insist that his 
own law or perhaps some other foreign law be used as the supplementary 
legal system in deciding issues not regulated by the contract. There is 
nothing to prevent the parties in case of a limited liability company 
with two members, one of whom is Hungarian and the other German, 
to choose Swiss law as the law applicable to the contract as supplementary 
law, prepare the contract in several languages and proclaim for example 
the English version as official and provide for the resolution of 
company law disputes for a French language arbitration procedure by a 
Paris tribunal, for example. 
 
 c) Limiting the mandatory nature of company law
  
 The legal regulation pertaining to the company agreement in case of a 
stock corporation is, as a general rule, mandatory in nature in the majority 
of he countries of the world, but mandatory regulation is rather 
widespread also in relation to the limited liability company. On the 
other hand, the shareholders’ agreement as an atypical contract is 
regulated almost completely by non-mandatory rules—not taking into 
account a few exceptional provisions of the Part of the Civil Code on 
General Rules of Obligations, there is a possibility for honouring the 
intention of the parties almost completely. The parties therefore wish 
to make use of the shareholders’ agreement in order to ease the strictness 
of the mandatory rules of company law. The question only is, to what 
extent does the law of the seat of the company accept the “inter-
vention” of the shareholders’ agreement into the company law, up to 
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what point does it honour solutions in the conflict between company 
law and general contract law to the disadvantage of company law. 
 
 The first question arises if some term in the shareholders’ agreement 
conflicts a term in the company agreement. The view may be taken that 
 a) the company agreement prevails 
 b) the contract concluded later prevails 
 c) the term in the prevailing contract automatically invalidates or 
modifies the terms of the weaker contract.12 
 The prevailing—and in my opinion correct—view in Hungarian arbitration 
practice is that in case of a collision between the company agreement 
and the shareholders’ agreement the content of each contract must be 
independently ruled upon, in other words the issue of collision need not 
be solved. From this it also follows that a breach of the “additional 
requirements” of the shareholders’ agreement may not have company law 
consequences. If accordingly e.g. in a shareholders’ agreement relating to 
a private stock corporation the majority Hungarian shareholder obliges 
himself to vote on a general shareholders’ meeting on the candidate 
proposed by the minority foreign member during the election of the 
supervisory board and, to the contrary, with the help of his majority he 
turns down the persons suggested by the foreigner, the decision of the 
shareholders’ meeting is valid in a company law sense and claims may 
“only” be put forward (e.g. for damages) according to the rules of civil 
law for breach of the shareholders’ agreement. This is the reason why the 
parties try to ensure compliance with the contract by way of security 
instruments, e.g. penalty clauses. 
 The content of the shareholders’ agreement may, however, in the given 
case lead to the invalidity of the company agreement. The “covering” or 
“fictitious” nature of the company (Mantell- or Scheingesellschaft) may often 
be established from the content of the shareholders’ agreement, thus e.g. 
that the parties chose the corporate form primarily to avoid taxation. The 
problem is that following the 1st EU Company Law Directive the possibility 
of establishing the invalidity of the company agreement is limited, con-
sequently even if a dispute over the shareholders’ agreement leads to 
finding a fault in the company agreement, it is not possible to draw the 
legal consequences of invalidity regarding the company agreement. 

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 For this view see Juhász, J.:     	
 a kft-n belül avagy felesleges 
duplicitás (The Collision of Contracts within the Limited Liability Company, or 
unnecessary Duplicity). Magyar Jog, 1991. No. 12. 730–732. 
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 The question is more difficult when the terms of the shareholders’ 
agreement are in contradiction to the rules of company law. The following 
cases may possibly arise from this aspect:  
 — the shareholders’ agreement is in contradiction to the non-mandatory 
rules of company law; 
 — the shareholders’ agreement expressly derogates the mandatory or 
imperative rules of the generally applicable parts of company law or of 
the part relating to the given type of company; 
 — the provisions of the shareholders’ agreement are not in express 
contradiction with company law but contain possibilities not mentioned 
therein or aim at a specific application of the provisions of company law. 
 In the first case it would follow from the independent nature of the 
shareholders’ agreement and the company agreement as legal transactions 
that it would only be possible to derogate the non-mandatory rules of company 
law in the company agreement. In this case Hungarian arbitration practice 
pierces the separation of the two contracts and generally makes it possible 
for the parties to derogate the non-mandatory rules of company law, i.e. 
those which allow for such deviation. In my opinion this practice is correct. 
 In the second case the arbitration practice regards the terms of the 
shareholders’ agreement conflicting the imperative or mandatory rules of 
company law (or even, with the application of Art. 239 of the Civil Code, 
the whole of the shareholders’ agreement) as being an illegal contract 
under Art. 200 of the Civil Code and consequently null and void. Thus 
e.g. the parties may not agree—regarding a limited liability company—
even in a shareholders’ agreement not to hold a single general shareholders’ 
meeting a year and bringing decisions e.g. as to financial reports by way 
of casting votes by post.  
 The third case represents the hardest problem and depends partly on 
the interpretation of the nature of the regulation as mandatory or imperative. 
E.g. the Companies Act lists the types of preferential stock in Art. 183; 
the question remains whether one may introduce in the shareholders’ 
agreement types of preferential stock not regulated in the Companies Act. 
Does this still form a part of the contractual autonomy of the parties or is 
the mandatory nature of the Companies Act provisions on preferential 
stock to be interpreted in a way that this creates a numerus clausus with 
regard to the types of preferential stock, providing for new types of 
preferential stock being invalid as a consequence? 
 In this question the arbitration and court practice is not unified neither 
internationally nor in Hungary. Some qualify as invalid, with a strict inter-
pretation of Art. 9 (1) of Companies Act, all applications not mentioned in 
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the Companies Act, whereas others qualify the freedom of contract of the 
parties as the stronger interest and regard these rules of the shareholders’ 
agreement (which usually find their way into the company agreement as 
well) as valid.13 The practice generally classifies as valid those terms of 
the shareholders’ agreement which aim at a particular application of the 
rules of company law in the company agreement. Such are e.g. the already 
mentioned shareholders’ agreements containing limitations on the practice 
of voting rights—voting agreement, Stimmbindungsvertrag. The traditional 
legal view, thus e.g. also the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) in the 1920s 
(see decision No. 3478/1925) considered voting agreements as conflicting 
the “morals of the good merchant”, thus null and void as immoral. More 
recently, however, the American and Western European practice tends to 
recognise the validity of these agreements—accepted also by more recent 
Hungarian practice, as opposed to practice in the Czech Republic.14 
 
 

 
13
 The issue is extensively dealt with in Balásházy, M. 
   
társasági és a polgári jog határán (Shareholders’ Agreement on the Borderline 
between Company Law and Civil Law). Gazdaság és Jog, 1993. No. 5. 
 
14
 See e.g. Waldvogel, M.: Zur Zulässigkeit von Stimmbindungsverträgen in 
Tschechien.  WIRO, 1997. No. 1. 13–16. 
